ABSTRACT Hadoop framework has been evolved to manage big data in cloud. Hadoop distributed file system and MapReduce, the vital components of this framework, provide scalable and fault-tolerant big data storage and processing services at a lower cost. However, Hadoop does not provide any robust authentication mechanism for principals' authentication. In fact, the existing state-of-the-art authentication protocols are vulnerable to various security threats, such as man-in-the-middle, replay, password guessing, stolen-verifier, privileged-insider, identity compromization, impersonation, denial-of-service, online/off-line dictionary, chosen plaintext, workstation compromization, and server-side compromisation attacks. Beside these threats, the state-of-the-art mechanisms lack to address the server-side data integrity and confidentiality issues. In addition to this, most of the existing authentication protocols follow a single-server-based user authentication strategy, which, in fact, originates single point of failure and single point of vulnerability issues. To address these limitations, in this paper, we propose a fault-tolerant authentication protocol suitable for the Hadoop framework, which is called the efficient authentication protocol for Hadoop (HEAP). HEAP alleviates the major issues of the existing state-of-the-art authentication mechanisms, namely operatingsystem-based authentication, password-based approach, and delegated token-based schemes, respectively, which are presently deployed in Hadoop. HEAP follows two-server-based authentication mechanism. HEAP authenticates the principal based on digital signature generation and verification strategy utilizing both advanced encryption standard and elliptic curve cryptography. The security analysis using both the formal security using the broadly accepted real-or-random (ROR) model and the informal (non-mathematical) security shows that HEAP protects several well-known attacks. In addition, the formal security verification using the widely used automated validation of Internet security protocols and applications ensures that HEAP is resilient against replay and man-in-the-middle attacks. Finally, the performance study contemplates that the overheads incurred in HEAP is reasonable and is also comparable to that of other existing state-of-theart authentication protocols. High security along with comparable overheads makes HEAP to be robust and practical for a secure access to the big data storage and processing services. 
I. INTRODUCTION
The existence of the digital universe is expanding by a factor of 300, from 130 exabytes to 40,000 exabytes, or 40 trillion gigabytes (more than 5,200 gigabytes for every man, woman, and child in 2020) from 2005 to 2020. From the recent time until 2020, the digital universe will about double every two years. 1 This of course, drag the attention of many researchers and practitioners in the field of Big Data storage and processing issue. To deal with this, various distributed file systems' namely Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS) [1] , Google File System (GFS) [2] , MooseFS, 2 zFS [3] , Ceph [4] , etc. have evolved. However, among these, due to popularity, simplicity and easy availability (open source), HDFS (the principal component of Hadoop framework 3 ) is widely used in industries and became the de facto standard platform for Big Data storage. HDFS has been evolved to provide the storage service, where data is reliably kept in a distributed fashion into different servers. In this connection, client stores Big Data into the geographically dispersed remote third party servers through an insecure channel. This excavates several security concerns as the storage service access to be made over an insecure communication channel. Towards the solution, a robust authentication mechanism is the preferred solution. In this synergy, different authentication protocols have been proposed such as Kerberos, 4 OAuth, 5 OpenID connect, 6 SAML, 7 etc. But for the sake of simplicity, scalability and applicability, operating system based security (i.e., password-based approach), Kerberos authentication protocol (i.e., password with possession-based approach) and delegated token based approaches are currently employed in Hadoop for enhancing its security [5] - [9] .
To access Big Data storage or processing services over the Internet, it is necessary for an end user (or service server) to initially enroll himself (or itself) with the Key Distribution Center (KDC) or a Centralized Registration Authority (CRA) offline. In centralized registration mechanism, it is difficult to update secret credentials of user and Hadoop clusters visa-vis service servers dynamically. After enrollment, the end user can access Big Data storage or processing services from the service server remotely over the Web. Usually, in such a setting, the KDC (or CRA) stores the secret information of all the principals' in its database, where a single point of vulnerability and single point of failure makes the whole system jeopardized [10] . In order to address these issues, many schemes have been reported in [5] and [11] - [30] that are based on different techniques namely, smart card based approaches [18] , [20] , [27] - [29] , one-time padding [13] , [14] , PKI (Public-Key Infrastructure) based approach [24] , [31] , implementation of a Trusted Computing Platform (TCP) [15] , combination of both password and possession based strategy [25] , [26] , [30] , authorization delegation based approach [22] , [32] , combined public and private key cryptography with random number generator based scheme [12] , utilizing basic geometry structure based password storing [33] and Identity-Based Authentication (IBA) scheme [23] , respectively. However, these explications are either expensive in terms of extra hardware cost or computationally intensive. Further, the existing approaches [24] - [26] , [30] enrol an end user (or service server) by asking his username and password (or service server identity and secret key), where the username (or service server identity) is used as the primary credential, which is verified at the time of mutual authentication between user and service server respectively. In fact, selecting a username (or service server identity) is not enough to be considered as a strong private identifier. As a result, an adversary can easily incorporate different attacks, such as impersonation attacks and identity compromisation attacks by sniffing the username (or service server identity) from the insecure media [10] . Moreover, these approaches are not considered the user-side and service server-side identity untraceability and anonymity properties. In spite of this, the existing password-based user enrollment strategy [30] which is currently incorporated in Hadoop is vulnerable to password guessing, online or offline dictionary and stolen-verifier attacks. Additionally, the existing approach [30] derive client's secret key as the hash value of its password. Therefore, the key will remain same until client changes the current password. However, changing this password needs updating the enrolled data maintained by the KDC (or CRA) and this, in fact, invites many key rollover problems [10] . In addition to this, man-inthe-middle, privileged-insider, denial-of-service, workstation compromisation, chosen plaintext and replay attacks are the key security threats that are not properly addressed in the existing schemes [10] .
In order to ensure mutual authentication and session key distribution between end user and service server (Namenode or JobTracker), in possession based (also called token based) approach, a trusted server distributes a token with large numbers of authentication parameters, that is, more parameters are included into the constitution of an Authentication Token (AT ) and authorization token (or Service Token (ST )). Hence, AT and ST verification increases the overhead to the existing authorization server (or service server). In addition to this, tokens and session keys are stored into user's credential cache [24] - [26] , [30] in the respective workstation, and each token has its own lifetime. So, it leads to workstation compromisation attack, disclosure of session key as well as VOLUME 6, 2018 misuse of tokens. Moreover, an end user blindly accepts the authentication services, that is, he completely rely on the trusted third party server (KDC's AS) issued shared secret session key without verifying the strong authenticity of the AS. Therefore, if the AS is compromised by a malicious insider, a byzantine attack can be induced into the system which can falsify the primitive operations and it can also lead to the wrong desires [10] . Nonetheless, some mutual authentication schemes [24] - [26] , [30] use time synchronization for joint authentication between end user and the service servers. More precisely, all principals in a realm must be synchronized with a centralized time server. In fact, this is an overhead for the implementation of the protocol. In addition to this, clock in a distributed system may not be always synchronized, so it may cause a replay attack for both the end user and the service server [34] . In spite of this, in the existing authentication approaches [24] - [26] , [30] , a user blindly trusts the authentication server (AS) without verifying any cross parameters (e.g., message authentication codes, server-side generated one-way hash chain based one-time identifiers [16] , digital signatures [10] , etc.) after receiving the authentication token. To the best of our knowledge, there is no solution to verify the originality of AS except the timestamps and visualization of password (or session key protected authentication or service token) [10] . Hence, this shortcoming opens a possibility of impersonation attacks [34] , where a compromised principle can falsify the basic operations of the authentication system. In addition to this, in Hadoop, there is no provision to verify the data integrity and confidentiality after archiving end user's or organization's Big Data into HDFS. Since, the raw data blocks (constructed from the Big Data) are stored into various Datanodes as plaintext format, it is easy for an adversary to modify the content of the data blocks easily [5] - [9] , [35] - [41] . Additionally, the result of the processed Big Data utilizing MapReduce framework is stored into end user's local file system, so anybody can read this content. To the best of our knowledge, there is no solution exists to mitigate these issues.
A. MOTIVATION
To address the aforesaid issues and challenges of the existing authentication schemes that assists security in Hadoop framework, we set the following objectives in the proposed scheme:
1) The proposed protocol should have the capability to enroll the Hadoop cluster's service server online (instead centralized deployment of service servers) with the authentication service provider by advocating the scalability issue.
2) The proposed protocol should prevent different well-known attacks, such as man-in-the-middle, replay, denial-of-service, privileged-insider, impersonation, identity compromisation, ciphertext-only, sever-spoofing and chosen plaintext attacks.
3) The proposed scheme should have a fault-tolerant and dependable authentication architecture to address the existing SOV and SOF issues.
4)
In the proposed scheme, the authentication task for both Big Data technology provider and user should be more robust and user friendly advocating less usage of security credentials and hardwares (smart card, biometric scanner, smart mobile device, etc.). 5) The proposed protocol should disseminate securely the session key between two communicating parties. 6) The proposed scheme should provide a mechanism to read, write and process the user's Big Data securely in Hadoop cluster. 7) The proposed protocol should support user and service server anonymity by hiding their original identities from eavesdroppers and privileged-insiders. 8) The proposed scheme should have a provision to generate a fresh session key securely in each session to mitigate the workstation compromisation attack. 9) The proposed protocol should have the capability to store the dictionary of password securely at the server-side to mitigate the offline dictionary, password guessing and stolen-verifier attacks. 10) The proposed scheme should able to establish the session key between two communicating parties without timestamps utilization. To fulfill the above objectives, a two-server based authentication framework has been introduced. This framework is structured in such a way that it mitigates the single point of failure (SOF) and single point of vulnerability (SOV) issues. Further, the proposed framework resists various well known security threats, such as, man-in-the-middle, replay, privileged-insider, Denial-of-Service (DoS), chosen plaintext, password guessing, identity compromisation, impersonation, stolen-verifier, server spoofing, offline dictionary and workstation compromisation attacks. According to the policy of the proposed framework a service provider can enrol any number of Hadoop clusters vis-a-vis service servers online with the Key Distribution Center (KDC). In this framework, the proposed KDC consists of three different servers. Among them, two are public servers (one server interacts with clients only and the other communicate with Big Data service providers) and the other is private server. Initially, clients and Big Data service providers enrol themselves offline with the private server. After offline registration, both client and service provider would eligible for online registration through the respective KDC's public server. As the private server is hidden from universal access, it ensures the server-side security. In the proposed framework, after online registration, the service providers are able to enroll his service servers (Namenode servers or Job Trackers) online with the KDC. So, the service server registration is simple and scalable in nature. Mean while, the clients' are able to communicate directly with the service servers' (Namenode Servers or Job Trackers) in a Hadoop cluster after establishing a secret key with the KDC's public server followed by a two-server based mutual authentication process (we call it as single sign-on). This single sign-on facility provides the access to any number of service servers by accomplishing only one time authentication 75344 VOLUME 6, 2018 with the KDC. As a solution to the server spoofing and DoS attacks, we consider here a two-factor (password and authorization token) based authentication strategy. To preserve privacy, in our scheme, we make the original identity of users and service servers fully anonymous. To enhance the robustness and correctness of entity authentication, we propose a new digital signature based entity verification scheme utilizing both symmetric and asymmetric key cryptography. As a remedy of chosen plaintext attacks, we use stateless Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode of symmetric encryption and decryption strategy where a random nonce is utilized as an Initial Vector (IV). To establish a secure session between two communicating parties, we propose a new pair-wise session key agreement policy using elliptic curve cryptography. As a solution to the client-side workstation compromisation attacks, we store client's secret information indirectly into a private place (server-side) and later on it can be fetched by the legitimate user's only. Moreover, to check the integrity of data blocks which resides into various chunk servers or Datanodes in HDFS, a Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) based secure HDFS-read and HDFS-write operations has been introduced.
B. RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS
The major research contributions devised in this paper are listed below.
• We propose a new secure and scalable enrollment methodology to register a cluster of service servers with the trusted third party server by eliminating traditional in-house (centralized) service server registration policy.
• We then introduce a new fault tolerant authentication framework to provide dependable authentication services for remote clients.
• Next, we propose a new digital signature based mutual authentication policy, where each principal is able to verify the legitimacy of other intended principals along with the trusted third party on which both the principal rely on.
• We also introduce a new approach for security credentials distribution and replication policies in order to mitigate server-side single point of failure and single point of vulnerability issues.
• To distribute the session key securely between two intended principals, we then propose an elliptic curve cryptography based session key distribution policy by utilizing the concept of in-memory caching.
• In addition, we propose a mechanism to disseminate the session key between two communicating entities without compromising their identities.
• The extensive formal security inspection by utilizing de facto Real-Or-Random (ROR) model and the informal security analysis substantiate that the proposed protocol can address various well-known attacks against active and passive adversaries.
• The formal security verification using the widely-used AVISPA tool has been carried out for the proposed protocol, and the AVISPA simulation results assist that the proposed scheme is secure against man-in-themiddle and replay attacks.
• To enhance security, the proposed protocol has a facility to dynamically update user's password and service server's secret credentials online with the help of the authentication servers.
• Finally, the proposed scheme is user-friendly in nature and the user needs to remember only his/her identity and password to login into the proposed authentication system.
C. ROAD MAP OF THE PAPER
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We discuss the network model of HDFS in Section II. Section III presents the related work associated with the entity authentication in Hadoop. The necessary related mathematical preliminaries are discussed in Section IV, which are helpful for describing and analyzing the proposed protocol. In Section V, we demonstrate the proposed scheme. Section VI presents both formal security analysis using the widely-accepted Realor-Random (ROR) model and informal security analysis of the proposed protocol. In Section VII, we simulate the proposed protocol under the broadly-used On-the-Fly Model Checker (OFMC) and SAT-based Model Checker (SATMC) backends by utilizing the AVISPA tool and summarize the attack traces. Section VIII presents the performance analysis of the proposed scheme. In Section IX, we elaborate few appealing features as the realizations of the proposed scheme. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section X.
II. NETWORK MODEL OF HDFS
Apache Hadoop 8 is an open source and provides a new way for storing and processing Big Data. It consists of two core components. The former one is File Store (FS) and later one is a Distributed Processing System (DPS). The FS is called as HDFS 9 and the DPS is termed as MapReduce. 10 HDFS is a distributed file system designed for storing very large files with streaming data access patterns, running on clusters of commodity hardware. Files are divided into blocks (default block size is 64 MB) and blocks are replicated and stored at different chunk servers (also called slave servers). The basic architecture of HDFS is shown in Figure 1 . Note here, we have shown only two Namenode servers (NSs) and one JobTracker (JT) in Figure 1 , but in practical HDFS federation architecture 11 it cloud vary up to n number of such servers. Intuitively, the three noteworthy classifications of machine roles in a single Hadoop Cluster (HC) are client machine (i.e., HDFS Client), Master Node (MN) (i.e., combination of Namenode and Job Tracker) and Slave Nodes (SNs) (i.e., combination of Datanodes (DNs) and Task Trackers (TTs)) (see Figure 1 ). All these components are connected through a communication network. In this architecture, for a single Hadoop Cluster say HC j , the MN regulates two useful functions i.e., reliable data storage using HDFS and parallel computations utilizing MapReduce framework. The Namenode manages and facilitates distributed data storage services wherein the JT administers the parallel processing of stored data utilizing MapReduce (MR). Moreover, SNs are responsible for streamline data blocks storing and running the parallel computations over the stored data blocks. Each SN runs both Datanode and TT daemon and receives instructions from their MN. The TT daemon is a slave to the JT and the Datanode daemon acts as a slave to the Namenode. Client machine has Hadoop installed with all the cluster settings, however, it is neither a master nor a slave. Rather, the role of the Client machine is to load data into the cluster, submit MapReduce jobs portraying how that data ought to be processed, and after that, retrieve or view the results of the job when it's completed.
III. RELATED WORK
Hadoop framework has been evolved to manage a massive volume of data in Cloud. However, Hadoop does not provide any robust authentication mechanism for principals' authentication [5] - [7] , [30] , [34] . Since very few literature is available in this domain, the related work that is illustrated here is two fold: first, we discuss the state of the art authentication protocols and its variant that are actually studied in Hadoop (Big Data) platform and finally, we present the recent development of Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) protocols in the domain of Cloud Computing platform as well as two-server based Password-assisted Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) schemes.
A. STATE OF THE ART AKEs FOR HADOOP (BIG DATA) PLATFORM
A limited number of authentication and key exchange protocols [5] , [11] , [13] - [17] , [22] - [24] , [30] , [32] , [42] has been found in this category.
Shen et al. [15] have proposed a theoretical prototype system combined with trusted platform support service. In their scheme, they have used a Trusted Computing Platform (TCP) to resolve the process of authentication in Hadoop. In TCP, the users identity is preserved and it is encrypted with users personal key and this mechanism is integrated in the hardware such as the BIOS and TPM. So it is very hard to decipher a user identity. The TCP is based on the Trusted Platform Module (TPM). The TPM is used to safeguard the system from different kind of hardware and software attacks. Authors have also pointed out the limitations in their scheme: (i) the stored data in the Datanodes will be decrypted when being accessed and will re-encrypted with different key after being accessed, the performance of system will be reduced, (ii) in order to make the authentication system trusted, some information are need to be stored among Namenodes, Datanodes and users, and finally (iii) TCB needs to fulfill many requirements of server-side and user-side, so it may be raised bottleneck situation in the system. Kohl and Neuman [30] proposed Kerberos authentication protocol. In their proposed approach, a user first registers with the system to avail the services. In this scheme, all the messages (i.e., authentication messages, service messages) are first encrypted using a shared secret key between two parties, and then the two parties communicate with each other with encrypted forms of messages. It may be noted that in the Kerberos protocol, a password based approach with a token based strategy needs to be followed for principal authentication. According to the current practice, a user makes an authentication request to an authentication server (AS) by means of a plain text containing ''username'' [34] . In this context, an attacker can eavesdrop the ''username'' and later expose himself to the AS as a legitimate user. In other word, an attacker can easily determine from the transmitted message that which users are currently online. In this situation, an attacker has scope to make man-in-the-middle attacks and replay attacks [10] . Further, an eavesdropper can make identity compromisation and impersonation attacks by stealing the ''username'' if the channel is insecure [34] , [43] , [44] . Moreover, the AS issues an authentication ticket (AT) to an end user after verifying only its ''username'' without verifying user's password or other security credentials [10] . However, as ''username'' is not a confidential credential, there is an opportunity for an attacker to get multiple authentication tickets by simply sending a ''username'' to the AS. As a consequence, a cryptanalyst can decrypt the ciphertexts (i.e., ATs) using some knowledge about underlying user's password. Thus, this scheme is vulnerable to Ciphertext-only Attack (COA). To avert this challenges, a public key infrastructure based Kerberos namely PKINIT [24] is reported and deployed in Hadoop. But, it is not properly addresses the user and service server's privacy issues and other security threats [10] .
Somu et al. [14] proposed an authentication scheme for Hadoop and it is based on the encryption mechanism using one-time pad key. A random key is used to encrypt the password for secure transmission between the two servers (Registration Server and Back-end Server). Authors has claimed that their protocol makes the Hadoop environment more secure as the new random key for encryption is generated for each login. They also claimed that their scheme reduces the possibility to decrypt the cipher stored into the server for an adversary as it involves the knowledge about the valid random key. Sarvabhatla et al. [13] For users' job authorization in Hadoop, an hash-based (MD5 and SHA-1) delegated job token mechanism has been reported in [5] . OAuth [22] , OpenID connect [32] and SAML [42] are the new evolving authorization delegation based approach and it has been prioritize over traditional Kerberos protocol for principals' authorization and single sign-on capability incorporated in Hadoop.
Rahul and GireeshKumar [12] proposed a novel authentication framework for Hadoop. Their framework uses cryptographic functions such as public key cryptography, private key cryptography, hash functions, and random number generator. In this framework, they define a new key for each client and authenticate all clients and services using this key. They claimed that their authentication framework offers user data protection, a new way of privilege separations, and basic security needs for data storing inside HDFS.
Sadasivam et al. [11] proposed a novel authentication protocol for Hadoop in cloud environment, where they have used the basic properties of a triangle and modified two server-based model to improve the security level of Hadoop clusters. In their scheme, they have interpreted and alienated the user given password using the authentication server and stored in multiple back-end servers along with the corresponding username.
Kang and Zhang [23] proposed an Identity-Based Authentication (IBA) scheme which is of short key size, identitybased, non-interactive. This scheme divides the sharing users into the very same domain and in this domain relies on the sharing global master key to exercise mutual authentication. Their IBA scheme can be enabled by an emerging cryptographic technique from the bilinear pairing (i.e., Weil and Tate pairing [45] and its security can be assured by the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (BDHP)). But the limitation of this scheme is, if the global master key is leaked, then the total system will be jeopardized.
Sharma and Navdeti [6] listed various security mechanisms inside Apache Hadoop Stack. According to the authors, most of the cases, the Kerberos approach is preferably used for delivering authentication services.
Srinivas et al. [17] proposed 2PBDC: a privacy-preserving Big Data collection scheme in cloud environment utilizing elliptic curve cryptography. The authors shows that 2PBDC offers a better trade-off among the security and functionality features, communication and computation overheads. Aujla et al. [16] proposed SecSVA: Secure Storage, Verification, and Auditing of Big Data in the Cloud Environment. The authors presented an attribute-based secure data deduplication framework for data storage on the cloud, Kerberos-based identity verification and authentication, and Merkle hashtree-based trusted third-party auditing on cloud.
of Karla and Sood scheme. Yang et al. [48] proposed an authentication scheme in a cloud environment setting. However, Chen et al. [49] [49] , and proved that their scheme is vulnerable to offline password guessing as well as impersonation attacks. In addition, it was found that Chen et al.'s scheme does not provide user anonymity and it also has clock synchronization problem.
Later, Hao et al. [51] presented a time-bound ticketbased mutual authentication scheme for cloud computing. The purpose of using the time bound tickets is to reduce the server's processing overhead. Unfortunately, Jaidhar [52] identified that Hao et al.'s scheme [51] is insecure against denial-of-service attack during the password change phase. Wazid et al. [20] also proposed a provably secure user authentication and key agreement scheme for cloud computing environment. Their scheme withstands the weaknesses of the existing schemes and it also supports extra functionality features, such as user anonymity, and efficient password and biometric update phase in multi-server environment.
Recently, Gope and Das [53] proposed an anonymous mutual authentication scheme for ubiquitous mobile cloud computing services, which allows a legitimate mobile cloud user to enjoy n-times all the ubiquitous services in a secure and efficient way, where the value of n may differ based on the principal he or she has paid for. In addition, Odelu et al. [21] reviewed Tsai-Lo's scheme [54] and pointed out that their scheme does not provide the session-key security and also strong user credentials' privacy. To remove the security weaknesses found in Tsai-Lo's scheme, Odelu et al. designed a provably secure authentication scheme for distributed mobile cloud computing services. In addition to this, various biometric and smartcard based multi-factor authentication protocols [55] - [63] are found in the recent literature for multi-server environment. In spite of these approaches, various two-server based PAKE schemes [64] - [68] are evolved to mitigate server-side dependability (by addressing single point of failure and single point of vulnerability) and security issues.
IV. MATHEMATICAL PRELIMINARIES
The proposed authentication protocol is based on both asymmetric and symmetric key cryptography. From Definition 1, it is easy to proof that a deterministic encryption scheme is not IND-CPA secure [61] . Further, there exists five generic modes of symmetric encryption scheme in the literature, namely Electronic Codebook (ECB), Output Feedback (OFB), Cipher Block Chaining (CBC), Cipher Feedback (CFB) and Counter (CTR) respectively. From these aforesaid modes, both ECB and stateful CBC modes are not IND-CPA secure, particularly in stateful CBC mode the value of Initialization Vector (IV ) remains constrained which is shared between the sender and receiver. But, in stateless CBC mode, the IV value is chosen randomly for each message block. Thus, we use AES with stateless CBC mode of encryption or decryption policy throughout this paper so that it becomes IND-CPA secure [61] .
B. ONE-WAY HASH FUNCTION AND ITS PROPERTIES
A one-way hash function h: {0, 1} * → {0, 1} l takes a binary string of variable length input, say x ∈ {0, 1} * and results a binary string h(x) ∈ {0, 1} l as an output of fixed length, say l bits. The formal definition of h(·) is provided as follows [69] [70] .
C. ELLIPTIC CURVE AND ITS PROPERTIES
Suppose m, n ∈ Z p , where Z p = {0, 1, . . . , p−1} and p > 3 is a prime [10] . A non-singular elliptic curve y 2 = x 3 + mx + n over the finite field Z p is the set E p (m, n) of solutions (x, y)
where m, n ∈ Z p such that 4m 3 + 27n 2 = 0 (mod p), and a point at infinity or zero point O.
Note that 4m 3 + 27n 2 = 0 (mod p) is a necessary and sufficient condition to ensure a non-singular solution for the Eq. x 3 + mx + n = 0 [71] . 4m 3 + 27n 2 = 0 (mod p) implies the elliptic curve is singular.
Hasse's theorem states that the number of points on E p (m, n), denoted as #E, satisfies the following inequality [72] :
In other words, there are about p points on an elliptic curve E p (m, n) over Z p . Also, E p (m, n) forms a commutative or an abelian group under addition modulo p operation.
• Elliptic curve point addition: Let P, Q ∈ E p (m, n) be two points on the elliptic curve. Then, R = (x R , y R ) = P + Q is calculated as follows [72] :
• Elliptic curve point scalar multiplication: In ECC, multiplication is done as repeated additions. For example, 5P = P + P + P + P + P, where P ∈ E p (m, n). Definition 3 (ECDLP Assumption): Given an elliptic curve E p (m, n) and two points R, S ∈ E p (m, n), find an integer
Definition 4 (ECDDHP Assumption): Given a point R on an elliptic curve E p (m, n) and two other points x · R, y · R
V. THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL
In this section, we discuss the proposed scheme in detail. We call the proposed scheme as HEAP (Efficient Authentication Protocol for Hadoop). The system architecture of HEAP is shown in Figure 2 .
A. SYSTEM MODEL Six types of principals are involved in the proposed system model: 1) client (C), 2) Big Data Service Provider (BDSP) 3) Namenode Server (NS) or Job Tracker (JT ), 4) Client Management Server (CMS), 5) Namenode Management Server (NMS) and 6) Enrolment Server (ES). Both CMS and NMS are the public servers in two-server model, whereas ES is the private server. CMS is reachable to C i utilizing a client application instance say HCA j , where i ∈ {1, 2, 3, · · · , n}. NMS is reachable to BDSP j 's administrator using a server application instance say HSA k , where j ∈ {1, 2, 3, · · · , m}. Both CMS and NMS are reachable to adversaries but, ES operates in the background and it is fully supervised internally by the respective system administrator only. Thus, ES is fully trusted principal in the network. To make the proposed system model fault-tolerant, we distribute C i 's secret credentials into two servers (NMS and ES) whereas disseminates BDSP's administrators and their deployable service server's (NS's and JT 's) private (secret) information into another pair of servers (CMS and ES).
Initially, BDSP's administrator needs to register all the service servers (NS and JT ) of his own Hadoop cluster with ES online. To do this, BDSP's administrator first enrol himself with ES and go through an authenticated key agreement procedure utilizing both NMS and CMS server. C enrol himself with ES during registration phase, but the authenticated session key agreement task will be held by both CMS and NMS. To prove the legitimacy of client C and BDSP's administrator, both need to give responses about three different challenges (specifically maintained by a two-step verification process utilizing user identity, password and digital signature) assisted by both the servers (CMS and NMS). The successful legitimacy checking provides a Big Data storage or processing service server ticket to C and service server enrolment access privilege to BDSP's administrator. The provided service ticket will then give access to the NS or JT after accomplishment of a mutual authentication and session key establishment process. The application instance HCA j will give access to the CMS for C i including adversaries whereas HSA k will provide access to NMS for BDSP's administrator including attackers. But, it is not possible for an adversary to access both CMS and NMS together utilizing a single application say HCA j or HSA k .
B. ADVERSARY MODEL
Presently, we have found three widely used threat models in the literature such as, Dolev-Yao threat model (DY model) [73] , Canetti and Krawczyk adversary model (CK-adversary model) [74] , and Extended Canetti and Krawczyk threat model (eCK-adversary model) [75] to model active and passive adversaries. However, we adopt DY model and CK-adversary model to study the proposed protocol.
Under DY model [73] , an insecure channel between two communicating parties has been modeled mathematically in VOLUME 6, 2018 such a way that an adversary Adv can intercept, delete or modify the exchanged messages. In addition to this, Adv may insert a fake message into the communication media to disgust the normal operations between two communicating parties. In the CK-adversary model [74] (the super set of DY model), the adversary Adv not only eavesdrop, delete or modify the exchanged messages between two communicating parties but also having the access to the session keys (shortterm keys), long-term secret keys and session states of each party involves into the key agreement process. This model ensures the security of the authenticated key agreement protocol considering some sorts of security credentials (long-term and short-term) leakage and its impact on the security of other secret credentials.
We follow both DY and CK-adversary model in the proposed protocol, where we assume HEAP-KDC is trusted for both C and NS (or JT ). Further, it is assumed that CMS and NMS are semi-trusted, whereas ES is fully trusted server. According to the policy of the DY model, any two parties such as C and NS or C and JT , are not considered as trustworthy principals in the network. Therefore, in this DY model, an adversary (active and passive) Adv can then eavesdrop, modify or delete the exchanged messages between C and NS or C and JT during communication. We also assume that the information stored at the C's workstation (mobile device) can be stolen by Adv and after obtaining the stolen information, Adv can perform the stolen-verifier and privileged-insider attacks. In addition, under the CK-adversary model, adversary Adv can have access some form of secret credentials including session key and session states between C and NS or C and JT . Under this assumption, the proposed protocol needs to show less security breech possibility of other entities' (BDSP, CMS, NMS and ES) secret credential due to the leakage of ''session ephemeral secrets'' between C and NS or C and JT .
However, in this study, we inspect several known security threats such as, chosen plain-text, denial-of-service, manin-the-middle, online password guessing, server compromisation, replay, privileged-insider, stolen-verifier, offline password guessing, workstation compromisation, server spoofing and identity compromisation attacks considering both DY and CK-adversary model.
C. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF HEAP
HEAP goes through five basic operations: (i) HEAP-KDC configuration, (ii) user enrollment, (iii) Big Data service provider registration, (iv) Hadoop Cluster vis-a-vis service server enrollment and (v) mutual authentication and session key agreement between user and service server. Two security application instances namely HCA j and HSA k are running separately on user's workstation and service provider workstation to access a particular public server (CMS or NMS) of the HEAP-KDC's realm. More precisely, C accesses only CMS through the application HCA and the service provider accesses only NMS through the application HSA.
Initially, a Big Data Service Provider (BDSP) (or specifically the BDSP's administrator (BA)) needs to register himself with the ES through out-of-band channel (for example, a postal network) with his identity proof documents, service level agreement, service server details, etc. This entails to avail a one-time dummy identity, one-time dummy password and a pass-phrase to the service provider. After receiving these parameters offline, the service provider enrolls himself online with the HEAP-KDC utilizing both NMS and HSA. During online registration, the service provider needs to provide both the dummy identity and the dummy password to NMS through HSA. This entails to get a user account creation permission from NMS. In such a provision, the service provider sends his information namely, masked identity, masked password, email identity and mobile number, etc. to both CMS and ES servers utilizing NMS via a secure channel (utilizing pass-phrase as a key). After sending the service provider's information to CMS and ES, NMS only keeps the masked identity in its database. Similarly, an end user C register himself with ES by taking the help of CMS and HCA. During this operation, C sends his transformed identities, masked password, email identity and mobile number securely to NMS and ES servers via CMS. In this way, both user and service provider registration process has been accomplished.
After accomplishment of registration task, the BDSP needs to keep his original identity and password with himself. These two secrets are utilized at the time of service provider login phase. After successfully logged in into its workstation (locally) using HSA, the BDSP can register his Hadoop Cluster vis-a-vis Big Data storage and processing service servers (NSs' and JT s') with HEAP-KDC followed by a mutual authentication and key agreement process utilizing both NMS and CMS servers (two-server based authentication). This process is scalable in nature, where any Big Data service providers can able to enroll his cluster's service servers' online with HEAP-KDC. BDSP securely enrolls each service server to both CMS and ES through NMS by assigning a service server's masked identity and a masked password.
Similarly, after registration, C needs to keep his user identity and password secret with himself for logging in into its workstation. At the time of login, C needs to authenticate himself in its workstation locally utilizing HCA by providing his identity and password. After that, C goes through a mutual authentication and key formation process utilizing both CMS and NMS servers (dual server based authentication). This entails a short-term key to C. Utilizing this short-term key, C establishes a secure session with CMS. We call this process as single sign-on of client C. After the single sign-on task, CMS provides two encrypted tickets: (1) client ticket and 2) service server (either Big Data storage service server or processing service server) ticket to C. Utilizing this two tickets, C establishes a secret session with a service server (either NS or JT ) associated with a particular cluster.
During two-server based mutual authentication and key agreement phase, the service provider (BA) enters his original identity and password to HSA. HSA computes a masked identity of the given identity. HSA then construct a digital signature on the masked identity utilizing a random nonce and BA's chosen private key. After that, HSA sends the masked identity and the digital signature to NMS. In the same way, NMS construct a digital signature by signing its original identity with its private key. NMS sends BA's masked identity and BA's digital signature along with NMS's encrypted digital signature and NMS's identity to CMS. After verifying the identities of both BDSP and NMS, CMS decrypt NMS's signature. Thereafter, CMS modifies both the digital signatures utilizing the previously shared pass-phrases of both the parties (BDSP and NMS) and CMS's private key. CMS encrypts the modified signatures using BDSP's masked password and NMS's shared key. CMS then sends both the encrypted signatures to NMS. NMS decrypts the respective signature and verifies the legitimacy of both BDSP and CMS utilizing the previously loaded security parameters and sends the other signature to BDSP. After receiving the modified signature, BDSP (or BA) checks the legitimacy of both NMS and CMS. Finally, using the random nonces and ECC, both BDSP and NMS establish a session key between themselves. In the same way, at the time of single sign-on process, C establishes a short-term key with CMS.
After establishment of a secure session with NS utilizing HCA, C outsources its Big Data in terms of raw data blocks and its replicas into several Datanodes or chunk servers under the supervision of NS. In such a provision, HCA supplies the session key to the corresponding HDFS Client (HDCL) to achieve secure and integrity-assisted HDFS-read and HDFS-write operations. Thus, it will protect the user's confidential Big Data from the third party interception.
To make the proposed authentication protocol fault tolerant in terms of security credentials' replications, we keep the service providers and service servers credentials (mainly transformed identities and masked passwords) under CMS's custody whereas disseminate the C's credentials to NMS. Mean while, all the security credentials information are replicated concurrently into ES server. In addition to this, to transform the service provider's identity and password, two random secrets (one secret generated by NMS and other produced by the HSA) are embedded with the service provider's original user identity and password first, and afterwards a cryptographic one-way hash function has been applied with themselves. Similarly, C's original user identity and password are encapsulated with CMS's chosen secret and HCA's secret, respectively. Thus, the aforesaid mechanism leads to create a strong password for both the parties (service provider and C) as well as reduce the chance of both single point of failure and single point of vulnerability issues.
To discuss HEAP methodology, we use various notations throughout the paper. The notations and their descriptions are listed in Table 1 . In addition to this, we make certain assumptions for HEAP. These assumptions are described as follows:
1) Two security application instances say HCA i and HSA k are running concurrently into two separate workstations (user's and service provider's workstations) which enable to access the public servers (i.e., CMS and NMSs) in a HEAP-KDC realm. 2) An administrative application instances say, ''h-admin'' takes the responsibility of initial credentials' (i.e., private keys, pass-phrases and public identities) configuration in the key distribution center (HEAP-KDC) (also see Figure 2 ). 3) A Trusted Central Certification Authority (TCCA) chooses a generator G on the elliptic curve E p (m, n) of order q, and selects two cryptographic hash functions say, H 1 (·) and H 2 (·). Further, the TCCA generates a certificate Cert E for an entity E. The entity E randomly chooses s E ∈ Z * q as private key and computes the corresponding public key as Q E = s E · G. 4) BDSP enrolls (i.e., online registration) himself with CMS via NMS followed by an offline registration with ES. After registration, BDSP needs to login into the system. After login, BDSP registers his Hadoop cluster vis-a-vis the service servers (NSs' and JT 's) with HEAP-KDC. Note that at least one cluster needs to be deployed with the KDC before initiating client registration. 5) C enrolls (i.e., online registration) himself with NMS via CMS followed by an offline registration with ES.
After registration, C needs to login into the system for accessing the service servers (NS's or JT 's). 6) C and NS or C and JT are not considered as trusted entity. They should mutually verify their legitimacy with the help of both CMS and NMS. After verification, either C and NS or C and JT become trusted to each other.
7) CMS keeps masked identities of Cs, R CMS C i
s and all the secret credentials related to the Hadoop cluster vis-avis the service servers information whereas NMS stores masked identities of BDSPs, R NMS BDSP s and all the secret credentials of clients (Cs). ES is having all the secret information of Cs', BDSPs' and service servers'. Note here, it is not permissible for HEAP-KDC's server (CMS or NMS or ES) to store the secret credentials (mainly identity, password) of any principals in a plaintext format. 8) C or BDSP goes through a two-server based mutual authentication to avail services from the service server or deploy a new cluster with HEAP-KDC. 9) Finally, ES does not available to any other entities (Cs, NSs and JT s) except NMS and CMS.
D. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF HEAP
This section illustrates the detailed description of the proposed protocol phases as follows.
1) HEAP-KDC CONFIGURATION
HEAP undergoes an initial configuration phase, where a System Administrator (SA) frames the Key Distribution Center (i.e., HEAP-KDC). In this phase, all public servers are . Finally, h-admin loads all these security parameters into respective servers. After the completion of h-admin process execution, the known security parameters with the HEAP-KDC are summarized in Table 2 .
Note that h-admin also assigns two public identities for both client application (HCA) and service provider application (HSA), say HCA ID and HSA ID , respectively. HCA ID is publicly available to CMS and HSA ID is publicly available to NMS. Similarly, the public identity of CMS is known to HCA whereas the public identity of NMS are known to HSA. These identities are also useful for the key agreement process at the beginning of the client (or Big Data service provider) registration and login phases, respectively.
2) BIG DATA SERVICE PROVIDER REGISTRATION
Suppose a Big Data Service Provider (BDSP) wants to deploy a new Hadoop Cluster (HC j ) for providing the data storage and processing services via Internet. To enrol the HC j with HEAP-KDC, BDSP's Administrator (BA) needs to register himself with ES offline (i.e., via the out-of-band channel or postal network) by giving the detail about total number of service servers', service types, Service Level Agreements (SLAs), service servers' location information, service servers' subscription, payment documents, etc. This entails the BA to avail a synthetic identity (S BDSP ID ), a synthetic password (S BDSP PWD ) and a pass-phrase (K CMS,BDSP ) respectively, via the out-of-band channel to the BDSP's physical address. Before sending these three security credentials to BA, ES securely sends S BDSP ID and S BDSP PWD to the NMS for creating a synthetic account of BA. ES also sends securely the pass-phrase K CMS,BDSP to the CMS. Note that BA needs to use S BDSP ID , S BDSP PWD and K CMS,BDSP only for once to create his own profile into CMS with the help of NMS. Although, BA is permissible to use this pass-phrase K CMS,BDSP for his password updation and service server registration process. Step BDSPRG1: BA enters S BDSP ID 
Using this transformed identity T U , both BA and NMS establishes a shared secret key (SK (NMS,BDSP) ) between themselves followed by a mutual authentication process utilizing the similar analogy say ''Initial key establishment between C i and FEAS'' reported in DPTSAP [10] .
Step BDSPRG4: BA enters its new password as BDSP PWD into HSA. HSA computes the masked password
. Note that at the time of shared secret key establishment process R NMS BDSP was generated by NMS and it has been delivered securely using the key SK (NMS,BDSP) . Further, both BA's request and NMS's response messages using DPTSAP [10] are represented as msg B3 and msg B4 , respectively in Figure 3 .
Step BDSPRG5: B5.2 ). Finally, NMS sends a registration confirmation message as msg B6 to BA through HSA and goto Step BDSPRG7.
Step BDSPRG7:
, and then stores these information into HSA's database. HSA will use these information at the time of BA's login, service server registration and password updation phases.
Note that after accomplishment of the registration process, BA needs to remember only two parameters BDSP ID and BDSP PWD to login into the system and then he can enrol any VOLUME 6, 2018 number of Hadoop Clusters (HC) online with HEAP-KDC. Thus, the proposed service provider registration scheme is user friendly and scalable in nature. The online enrolment process of the HC driven by the BA is presented as follows.
3) HADOOP CLUSTER REGISTRATION
Hadoop cluster registration vis-a-vis service servers enrolment phase is proposed to carry out the different activities starting from service provider login to online registration of service servers (mainly, all Namenode servers and JobTrackers belongs to a particular Hadoop cluster say HC j , where j = 1, 2, · · · , m). The proposed enrolment phase consists of three activities: 1) service provider (BA) login, 2) mutual authentication and session key establishment between BA and NMS and 3) service servers registration. The detail steps involved in this process are discussed as follows. For simplicity, in this study, we assume a particular cluster say HC j consists of a single Namenode server (NS j ) and a single Job Tracker server (JT j ), and NS j is responsible to provide the Big Data storage services wherein JT j yields the Big Data processing services to the remote user online.
a: SERVICE PROVIDER LOGIN AT WORKSTATION
After the completion of BA's registration process, BA tries to login into the system using the server application HSA. Note here, before initiating service provider (BA) login into BA's workstation, HSA loads all BA's transform identities (that is, FI i , where i = 1, 2, · · · , k) into its browser cookie. A diagram summarizing several communication message exchanges between BA and NMS involved throughout the service provider login, authenticated key establishment and service server registration process are shown in Figure 9 , and it contains the following steps:
Step Step BDSPL2: 
b: AUTHENTICATED KEY AGREEMENT PHASE
After successful logging in into the system, HSA initiate an authenticated key formation process between BA/BDSP and NMS. The detail steps involved in this process are shown in Figure 9 and are discussed as follows. Step Figure 6 ) as Step MASKA8: NMS verifies the legitimacy of both BDSP and CMS utilizing the bcmsVerification(·) function shown in Figure 7 . If the function bcmsVerification(·) returns ''Accept'', then NMS construct a session key
to BDSP, and goto Step MASKA9; otherwise, it rejects BDSP's request.
Step MASKA9: After getting the message M 4 , BDSP verifies both NMS and CMS utilizing the following function ncmsVerification(·) (see Figure 8) . If the function ncmsVerification(·) returns ''Accept'' then BSDP receives NMS's response and constructs a session key 
Similarly, to verify the legitimacy of both NMS and CMS, Figure 10 , and it contains the following steps:
BDSP needs to verify
Step SSRG1: BDSP enters the security credentials namely the identity, symmetric key and synthetic password for both the service servers (i. ), respectively. Note that rss 1 and rss 2 are two random numbers chosen by HSA.
Step SSRG2: HSA computes the masked identity of BDSP as MT U and construct a message Step SSRG4: Upon getting the acknowledgements from both the servers (CMS and ES), NMS checks n 3 ?
= n 3 . If the condition is satisfied then NMS constructs a service servers' (here, we consider two service servers i.e., NS and JT in a particular cluster) registration completion message as M 6 = {NMS ID , MT U , n 3 ||HSA ID ||rss 2 ) information, respectively. Thus, completes the HC j 's deployment process. Finally, BDSP make the HC j online for providing the Big Data storage and processing services to the end users'.
Remark 1: In the service server registration phase, we present an enrolment strategy considering two service servers (Namenode Server (NS) and Job Tracker (JT )) belong to a particular Hadoop cluster (HC j ). But, for simplicity and better understanding, throughout this paper, we consider only one service server to describe the other phases of the proposed VOLUME 6, 2018 FIGURE 10. Summary of service server registration process. Note: Here,
protocol. Note that NS is responsible for providing Big Data storage services utilizing HDFS and JT is solely made for providing Big Data processing services using MapReduce to the end users'. Though, we restrict our discussion with NS only, but one could simply apply the same proposed mechanism for JT also.
Remark 2: According to the policy of the proposed scheme, the online enrolment process of the service servers' (NSs' or JT s' belongs to a particular cluster (HC j )) is simple, flexible and scalable. Because, a service provider (BDSP j ) can add or remove any number of service servers' (NSs' or JT s') to or form HEAP-KDC. However, to do this, the service provider needs to enroll himself with the HEAP-KDC once and keep his user identity and password secret.
4) USER REGISTRATION
Initially, a user C i needs to register himself with ES offline (i.e., via the out-of-band channel or postal network) by giving his identity proof, address proof and service subscription payment documents. This entails C i to avail a dummy user-id (D C ID ), dummy password (D PWD ) and a one-time key (K (NMS,C) ) via the out-of-band channel to his physical address. Before sending these three security credentials to C i , ES securely sends D C ID and D PWD to CMS for creating a dummy account of C i . ES also sends securely the one-time key K (NMS,C) to NMS. Note that C i needs to use D C ID , D PWD and K (NMS,C) only for once to create his own user profile into NMS with the help of CMS. But, C i is permissible to use the key K (NMS,C) (we also call it as pass-phrase) at the time of session key formation and password updation tasks. Figure 11 summarizes the user registration phase and contains the following steps:
Step ) and go to Step URG5. Here, R CMS C i was generated by CMS and it has been delivered securely using the key SK (CMS,C) at the time of ''secret key establishment'' process [10] . Further, both C i 's request and CMS's response messages using DPTSAP [10] are represented as msg C3 and msg C4 respectively in Figure 11 .
Step URG5: HCA j asks C i to give his registered mobile number (MBNO C ) and a valid email id. (EID C ). After taking MBNO C and EID C from C i , HCA j encrypts MT U, PWD * MBNO C and EID C using K NMS,C as 75358 VOLUME 6, 2018 FIGURE 11. Summary of user registration.
). HCA j sends the message msg C5 = {CMS ID , MT U, n 2 , U Dtl } to the CMS.
Step URG6: After receiving msg C5 , CMS broadcasts both MT U and U Dtl to both ES and NMS servers respectively. CMS keeps only MT U and R CMS C i in its database and deletes other information, wherein, after decrypting U Dtl , both ES and NMS stores MT U, EID C , MBNO C and PWD * into their corresponding databases. Finally, CMS sends a registration confirmation message to C i through HCA j and goto Step URG7.
Step URG7:
) and USPW i = h(C ID ||HCA ID ||PWD ||r i ), and then stores these information into HCA j 's database. HCA j will use these information at the time of user authentication and password updation phases.
After successful registration of client C i with HEAP-KDC, C i needs to remember only two parameters C ID and PWD to access the services from any on-demand service server (either NS j or JT j ) belongs to a particular Hadoop cluster say HC j followed by a user login and authenticated key agreement phases discussed in the following sections. Thus, the proposed protocol is user friendly in nature.
5) USER LOGIN AT WORKSTATION
After the completion of user registration process, C i tries to login into the system using the client application HCA j . Before initiating user login task into C i 's workstation, HCA j loads the user's masked identities (EI i , where i = 1, 2, · · · , n) into browser cookies. The client-side login process contains the following steps:
Step UL1: C i enter his original identity C ID After logged in into the client system, C i needs to select the j th cluster say HC j from a list of Hadoop clusters (HC 1 , HC 2 , · · · , HC j , · · · , HC n ) for storing or processing the Big Data. According to the selection, HCA j loads the respective client application say HDCL j belongs to the HC j into the client workstation. In order to store or process C i 's Big Data securely, HCA j initiate a single sign-on and FIGURE 12. Summary of mutual authentication and key establishment process between C i and CMS. Note: session key establishment task between C i and HEAP-KDC as follows.
6) SINGLE SIGN-ON AND DYNAMIC KEY ESTABLISHMENT
A two-server based Single sign-on (SSO) and Dynamic Key Agreement (DKA) process is proposed to access Big Data storage services from a remote Namenode Server (NS j ) (or access Big Data processing services from a remote Job Tracker (JT j )) of a specified Hadoop cluster say HC j . The proposed two-server based SSO and dynamic key agreement process establishes a dynamic key between C i and HEAP-KDC followed by a mutual authentication process. The detail steps involved in this tasks are discussed as follows.
Note here, the proposed SSO and dynamic key establishment between C i and CMS are based on ECC and AES. The known pre-deployed security domain parameters among HCA i , CMS and NMS are G, q, H 1 (·) and H 2 (·), respectively. Initially, HCA i selects a private key S C for client C i and computes the corresponding public key Q C = S C · G. Similarly, S CMS and S NMS are private keys for CMS and NMS and the corresponding public keys are Q CMS = S CMS · G and Q NMS = S NMS · G, respectively. Here, S C , S CMS and S NMS are belongs to Z q * . All these parties keep their private keys (i.e., S C , S CMS and S NMS ) secret, but disseminate the public keys Q C , Q CMS and Q NMS using Cert E . The proposed key agreement and mutual authentication task between C i and CMS are summarized in Figure 12 .
The detail steps involved in this process are discussed as follows.
Step DKA1:
). Further, HCA j generates two pseudo-random numbers (ψ 1
) utilizing MT U and other pre-loaded security domain parameters as the input to a function say cSignPairGen[ ](·) (see Figure 13 ).
Step DKA2: HCA j construct a message MC 1 = {MT U,
, Cert C } and sends it to CMS via a public channel.
Step DKA3: After receiving MC 1 , CMS searches its database to check the existence of MT U. Step DKA5: After receiving the message MC 2 , NMS searches both MT U and CMS ID in its database. If both are exists then NMS understands that both C i and CMS are legitimate parties, and goto Step DKA6; otherwise, rejects CMS's request.
Step DKA6: NMS loads both C i 's pass-phrase (K NMS,C ) and NMS's secret identity (SID CMS,NMS ) from its database. NMS modifies both C i 's and CMS's partial signatures (i.e., π 2 CMS and ψ 2 Figure 15 ) as (1) in Figure 16 . If the function cnmsVerif(·) returns ''Accept'', then CMS construct a session key SK C,CMS = R CMS · ψ 1
C i ) using a function nmodifiedSignPairGen[ ](·) (see
V cnew 3 = π 2 CMS + S NMS · H 2 (H 1 (K NMS,C )) (mod q) = R CMS · H 2 (H 1 (CMS ID ))+ S CMS · H 2 (π 1 CMS )+ S NMS · H 2 (H 1 (K NMS,C )) (mod q) and (2) V cmsnew 4 = ψ 2 C i +S NMS · H 2 (H 1 (SID CMS,NMS )) (mod q) = R C · H 2 (H 1 (MT U) +S C · H 2 (ψ 1 C i ) +S NMS · H 2 (C i = R CMS · R C · G and a message MC 4 = {MT U, CMS ID , π 1 CMS , E(PWD * : [MT U ||V cnew ]), Cert NMS , Cert CMS }. CMS sends MC 4 to C i ,
and goto
Step DKA9; otherwise, it rejects C i 's request.
Step DKA9: After getting the message MC 4 , C i verifies both NMS and CMS utilizing the function cmnmVerif(·) (see Figure 17) . If the function cmnmVerif(·) returns ''Accept'' then C i constructs a session key After establishment of the dynamic key SK C,CMS between C i and CMS, HCA j allows C i to move further for requesting service server ticket as follows. SID NMS,CMS ) ). To satisfy the verification condition, it must holds ψ 2
Proof of Correctness: In order to verify the legitimacy of both C i and NMS, CMS needs to check
V cmsnew · G = ψ 2 C i · G + Q NMS · H 2 (H 1 (C i ·G = ψ 1 C i ·H 2 (H 1 (MT U)) +Q C · H 2 (ψ 1 C i ) = R C · H 2 (H 1 (MT U)) · G +S C · H 2 (ψ 1 C i ) · G and Q NMS ·H 2 (H 1 (SID NMS,CMS )) = S NMS ·H 2 (H 1 (SID NMS,CMS ))· G. Similarly,
to verify the legitimacy of both NMS and CMS, C i needs to verify
V cnew · G = Y 11 · π 1 CMS + Y 22 · Q CMS + Y 33 · Q NMS . To satisfy the condition, it must satisfies Y 11 · π 1 CMS = Y 11 · R CMS · G, Y 22 · Q CMS = Y 22 · S CMS · G and Y 33 · Q NMS = Y 33 · S NMS · G.
7) BIG DATA STORAGE SERVICE SERVER TICKET GRANTING
In this process, C i requests for a Big Data storage service ticket from CMS. Before doing so, HCA j provides a drop-down list from which C i needs to select a particular Hadoop cluster say HC j . After selecting the cluster, HCA j automatically choose a Namenode Server (NS j ) for client C i . Finally, HCA j initiates the service server ticket granting process. A diagram summarizing the message exchanges between C i and CMS involved throughout the service ticket granting process is shown in Figure 18 , and it contains the following steps:
Step SSTG1: HCA j constructs a message MC 5 = {MT U, TNS ID Step SSTG3: CMS sends a message as MC 6 = {MT U, TNS ID , C token , NS token } to C i by acknowledging C i 's request message (MC 5 ) via a public channel.
Step SSTG4: Upon receiving the message MC 6 , C i checks both nonces (that is n 4 ∈ {Z 7 , C token }) are equals or not (see Figure 18 ). If both are equals then C i accepts CMS's response else, rejects CMS's response. Finally, after getting both the tokens (CT and NST ) from CMS, HCA j initiates a session key agreement process with the Namenode Server (NS j ) followed by a mutual authentication process discussed below.
8) SESSION KEY AGREEMENT WITH SERVICE SERVER
After receiving the service server token (NS token ) from CMS, HCA j initiate a session key agreement between C i and NS j . A diagram summarizing the communication message exchanges between C i and NS j involved throughout the session key agreement process is shown in Figure 18 , and it contains the following steps:
Step SKABSSA1: HCA j decrypts the C token and extracts OTK CMS,C . HCA j computes a modified signature pair as {ψ 1 Figure 19 ) and goto Step SKABSSA2.
Step SKABSSA2: HCA j constructs a message MC 7 = {MT U, TNS ID , ψ 1
C i
, V cc , NS token , Cert C } and send the same to NS j via a public channel.
Step SKABSSA3: After getting MC 7 , NS j decrypts NS token and check MT U ? = MT U utilizing ccmsVerif(·) function (see Figure 20 ). If it verifies successfully then NS j understands the legitimacy of client C i and goto Step SKABSSA4; otherwise, reject C i 's request.
Step SKABSSA4: NS j computes OTK CMS,C = h(OTK CMS,NS ||SID j NS ) and verifies the legitimacy of both C i and CMS by checking the following condition:
) (see Figure 20) . If the condition is satisfied then NS j realizes the legitimacy of client C i and computes 
a session key SK C,NS = h(R NS
, and goto Step SKABSSA5, else reject C i 's request.
Step SKABSSA5: NS j computes a signature pair as {P ns , V ns } using nsSigPairGen[ ](·) (see Figure 21) . NS j constructs a message MC 8 = {TNS ID , MT U, P ns , V ns , Cert NS } and goto Step SKABSSA6.
Step SKABSSA6: NS j sends MC 8 to C i via a public channel.
Step SKABSSA7: Upon receiving the message MC 8 , C i checks the legitimacy of both NS j and CMS by substantiating the following condition: Figure 22 ). If the condition is satisfied then C i realizes the legitimacy of both service server NS j and CMS, and computes a session key
, and goto Step SKABSSA8, otherwise; reject C i 's request. After establishment of the session key, HCA j redirects client C i to HDFS Client application instance say HDCL j to store (fresh write operation) or append or read Big Data under the supervision of NS j . By utilizing the aforesaid process, C i could establish a secure channel with JT j for processing Big Data.
Proof of Correctness: In order to verify the legitimacy of both C i and CMS, NS j needs to check 
). To satisfy the verification condition, it must holds ψ 1
Similarly, to verify the legitimacy of both NS j and CMS, C i needs to verify V ns · G = P ns · H 2 (H 1 (TNS ID || OTK CMS,C )) +Q NS ·H 2 (P ns ). To satisfy the condition, it must satisfies P ns = R NS · G and Q NS = S NS · G.
9) SECURE AND INTEGRITY-ASSISTED WRITE OR APPEND OPERATION IN HDFS
Suppose C i and NS j are having the session key SK C,NS between themselves. Now, say for instance, C i has four files (say f 1 , f 2 , f 3 and f 4 ) and each file is having 250 GB (gigabytes) data. C i wants to import these files from other external sources into HDFS, and it needs to create a Big File say F 1 with the file size of 1 TB (terabytes). According to the policy of HDFS, the file F 1 should go through the HDFS-Write task (see the basic HDFS-Write operation in Figure 23 ).
In to the respective chunk server for future activities (namely integrity-assisted read and processing the Big Data).
If client C i needs to append additional data in the existing file F 1 in the near future, he needs to follow the similar strategy as write operation as discussed above.
10) SECURE INTEGRITY-ASSISTED READ IN HDFS
In this phase, C i wants to read his previously archived Big Data (here the file F 1 ) from HDFS. The basic work-flow of HDFS-Read operation is shown in Figure 24 . According to the policy of HDFS, after getting the block locations from NS j via a secure channel followed by a session key (SK C,NS ) establishment process, C i can directly read the blocks from the chunk servers or Datanode servers through HDCL j . Suppose C i needs to read the i th block of the file F 1 . In this connection, HDCL j loads the same block and computes HMAC i . If the condition is satisfied then C i realizes the data integrity of i th block. Similarly, after verifying the data integrity of all the blocks belongs to F 1 (here, F 1 consists of 16384 blocks), C i set a boolean variable as flag = ''true'' which indicates that the file F 1 is not being modified by any attackers or insiders (more precisely, the data integrity of file F 1 has been preserved), otherwise; C i set the flag = ''false''. If the flag variable returns false for any j th block then C i goes through the service provider's Service Level Agreement (SLA) and takes proper action, else C i outsources map-reduce code [76] and flag to JT j for Big Data processing as follows. 
11) SECURE BIG DATA PROCESSING USING MAPREDUCE
At the beginning of this phase, C i establishes a session key (say SK C,JT ) with JT j followed by a mutual authentication and key agreement process (see Sec. V-D.8). After the key formation, C i sends the map-reduce code [76] and the flag to JT j via secure channel. After getting these information, VOLUME 6, 2018 JT j assigns different Task Trackers (TTs) or Datanodes to execute the map-reduce code for different blocks of C i 's file (say F 1 ). After successful execution of the code, JT j stores the result into C i 's local filesystem in encrypted format utilizing the key SK C,JT .
12) PASSWORD CHANGE PHASE
This section discuss about the password updation process of client C i and BDSP's administrator. Assume, the client C i needs to change his password for security reasons. To do this, the following steps need to be executed. Note here, after the execution of user login phase (refer Sec. V-D.5), HCA j has the following information:
) and
Step PCP1: C i enters his identity C ID and old password P old into HCA j and goto Step PCP2.
Step PCP2: HCA j locally verifies the condition UPW i
. If the condition is satisfied then HCA j asks C i to enter his updated password and goto Step PCP3, otherwise; re-enter the user id. and password again in HCA j .
Step PCP3: C i enters a new password P new into HCA j .
HCA j selects a random number r new i and computes
⊕h(r i ||PWD), and goto Step PCP4.
Step PCP4:
). HCA j select a random nonce n 5 and constructs a password update message as Pwd_chg_msg = {CMS ID , MT U, n 5 , U Dtl } (it is similar as the message msg C5 shown in Figure 11 ) and goto Step PCP5.
Step PCP5: HCA j sends Pwd_chg_msg to CMS.
Step PCP6: After getting Pwd_chg_msg, CMS checks MT U is an existing user or not. If user presents then goto Step PCP7, otherwise; reject C i 's password change request.
Step PCP7: CMS broadcasts both MT U and U Dtl (similar as the message msg C5.1 shown in Figure 11 ) to ES and NMS. After decrypting U Dtl , both ES and NMS updates their user databases and broadcasts their acknowledgement messages (same as the message msg C5.2 shown in Figure 11 ) to CMS. Thereafter, CMS sends a response message (similar as the message msg C6 shown in Figure 11 ) to C i about the confirmation of password updation request.
Step PCP8: After getting the response message from CMS,
||r new i ), respectively and stores them in its database for future use. Note that using the aforesaid mechanism, BDSP's administrator (BA) can update its password for security reasons utilizing both NMS and ES servers and the service provider application HSA k .
Remark 3: In order to prevent replay attack between C i and NS j , NS j can temporarily keep ψ 1
C i
and V cc in its system cache. The similar mechanism has been reported in [18] and [10] can be applied for the replay attack protection. Suppose a similar message MC 7 = {MT U, TNS ID , ψ 1
, V cc , NS token , Cert C } has been received by NS j . NS j first checks ψ 1
and V cc = V cc . If both the conditions are satisfied successfully then NS j treats the message MC 7 as replay message, otherwise; NS j treats the message MC 7 is fresh and NS j updates ψ 1
and V cc with ψ 1
and V cc in its system cache. In a similar way, the same procedure can be applied for other phases to protect replay attack.
Remark 4: To proof the proposed HEAP-KDC is fault-tolerant in terms of secret credentials storage, we distribute the credentials of clients (C i ), service provider (BDSP) and service servers (NS j and JT j ) among different servers in the following settings: ), respectively.
3) ES:
It keeps all the secret credentials of both CMS and NMS servers. In fact, at the time of online registration process, both CMS and NMS send their principal's secret credentials to ES. Note here, ES is a fully trusted server since it is not reachable online to any other principals (except CMS and NMS) including adversaries at the time of authentication process.
In such a settings, if CMS (or NMS) fails due to some hardware failure and the server data is totally lost then it could be rebuild from ES server. Similarly, if ES server fails then the entire legacy data can be extracted from both CMS and NMS servers to renovate a new ES. Thus, we can remark that for the current settings of HEAP-KDC, the proposed authentication framework is more dependable and fault-tolerant. Remark 5: At the time of mutual authentication and single sign-on process between C i and CMS, suppose any one of the random nonce R C or R CMS is known to the adversary Adv. In this connection it is obvious that Adv can compute
, respectively. In such a provision, to protect known session-specific temporary information attacks from Adv both C i and CMS can compute the session key as
).
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Therefore, the adversary Adv requires the knowledge of R CMS C i to compute the actual session key between C i and CMS. In the same way, BDSP and NMS can compute the sesseion key SK BDSP,NMS utilizing R NMS BDSP .
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
To prove that the proposed protocol (HEAP) is provably secure, we analyze the security of HEAP by utilizing both formal and informal security analysis. Further, to pursue the security analysis, we also use the proposed threat model as discussed in Section V-B.
A. FORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS USING ROR MODEL
In order to present formal security analysis of HEAP in detail, we first discuss few terminologies of the widely-used RealOr-Random (ROR) model [77] . Thereafter, utilizing the same model we substantiate that the proposed protocol (HEAP) provides the session-key (SK) security against an adversary Adv in Theorem 1.
1) ROR MODEL
In HEAP, we have four entities, namely, user C i , CMS, NMS and NS j (or Big Data processing service server JT j ). The following attributes are involved in the ROR model. ) -This query represents an active attack wherein HEAP-KDC's authentication token (Z 4 ) and C i 's authorization tokens (C token and NS token ) are leaked to the adversary Adv by compromising C i 's workstation. These information leakage is modeled using this query to check the security of the proposed protocol. It is reported in [61] that CorruptSmartWorkstation(·) query fortifies the weak-corruption model, where the temporary keys and internal credentials related to the participant instances are not corrupted. 5) Test( s ) -Applying this query, the semantic security of the session key SK is being modeled adopting the indistinguishability in ROR [77] . Before starting the experiment, an unbiased coin cn needs to be flipped and its result is only known to Adv. This result decides the output of the Test query. If Adv executes this query, and also SK is fresh, s outputs SK when cn = 1 or a random number in the same domain when cn = 0; otherwise, it will produce the output as a null value (⊥).
f: SEMANTIC SECURITY OF SESSION KEY
Under the ROR assumptions, Adv needs to apprehend a participant instance's real session key from a random key. To achieve this purpose, Adv can execute several Test queries against either s
). At the end of this experiment, Adv guesses a bit cn , and he or she wins the game if cn = cn. Assume S is an event that Adv can win the game, Adv's advantage in breaking the semantic security of the proposed protocol (HEAP) is denoted and defined by Adv AKE HEAP = |2 · Pr[S] − 1|. If Adv AKE HEAP ≤ , for a sufficiently small > 0, we say HEAP provides SK-security.
g: RANDOM ORACLE
Let us assume that the cryptographic one-way hash function h(·) is available to all the entities including Adv. We model h(·) by a random oracle, say H [10], [78] . Proof: In order to proof the above theorem, we go through a sequence of six games, say GM j (j = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) as in [19] and [78] . Let the initial game be GM 0 and the final game be GM 5 . Assume that S i represents as an event wherein Adv can successfully guess the bit cn in the Test(·) query with respect to the game GM j . All the games are outlined as follows.
• Game GM 0 : This is the initial game where the adversary Adv incorporates a real attack against HEAP under ROR model. Before starting of the game GM 0 , Adv chooses a bit cn. Under the ROR assumptions, the initial game GM 0 and the actual protocol are identical to each other. Hence, it follows that
• Game GM 1 : In this game, Adv performs the eavesdropping attacks by running the Execute(·) query. Finally, at the end of this game, Adv needs to call the Test(·) query. The result of the Test(·) query determines whether Adv obtains the real session key SK or a random number. In HEAP, the session key between C i and NS j is computed as
. Therefore, to reveal the session key SK C,NS , Adv needs the knowledge about two random secrets R C and R NS . Since we encapsulated these two secrets inside the exchanged messages (see MC 7 and MC 8 in Section V-D.8) indirectly, eavesdropping attacks against these messages are not beneficial to determine SK C,NS . Therefore, the probability of winning GM 1 by incorporating eavesdropping attacks by Adv is negligible. As a result, we say that both the games GM 0 and GM 1 are indistinguishable. Thus, we infer that
• Game GM 2 : We include the simulation of both Send(·) and H(·) queries into this game and transform the game GM 1 to the game GM 2 . This game is also modeled as an active attack. In this game, Adv eavesdrops all the exchanged messages (MC 1 , MC 2 , · · · , MC 8 ). According to the policy of HEAP, we appended a random nonce with each communicating message (send and receive) so that there will be no collision of hash outputs when Adv simulates it utilizing the Send(·) query. Thus, the birthday paradox results in the following inequality:
• Game GM 3 : This game is modeled as an active attack wherein Adv tries to compute the current session key SK C,NS between C i and NS j by obtaining the other credentials (specifically, V cnew and MT U) from the guessed password (PWD) of C i and the game GM 2 is transformed into the game GM 3 . Suppose Adv eavesdrops all the exchanged messages
)) only in order to encrypt the CMS's identifier (i.e., V cnew ) during the single sign-on and session key establishment process, but Adv does not have any provisions to check the transformed password of C i directly on the server-sides (both CMS and NS j ). Therefore, even if Adv guesses C i 's password, but he or she has no scope to verify it on the server-side. Moreover, to reveal the actual password (PWD) of C i correctly from client-end, Adv requires the knowledge about R CMS C i and r i . In fact, if the authentication system has a provision to check the limited number of incorrect passwords as inputs, we have the following result:
• Game GM 4 : This game is imitated as an active attack and the game GM 3 is transformed into the game GM 4 . In this game, Adv tries to compute the session key SK C,NS by utilizing both the public information (ψ 1 C i = R C · G and P ns = R NS · G) of C i and NS j and previously eavesdropped messages from the aforesaid discussed games. Since both C i and NS j can compute the session key as SK C,NS = h(R C ·P ns ||OTK CMS,C ) = h(R C ·R NS ·G ||OTK CMS,C ) by utilizing CMS server, it is obvious that having the knowledge about ψ 1
C i
and P ns , it is computationally hard to derive SK C,NS due to the difficulty of solving ECDDHP (see Section IV). Therefore, it follows that
• Game GM 5 : This is the final game and it is modeled as an active attack, and the game GM 4 is transformed into the final game GM 5 . In this game, Adv compromises the C i 's workstation and tries to compute the session key NS token and C token to get the parameters OTK CMS,NS and OTK CMS,C . Thus, it follows that
Since all the queries are successfully simulated in the final game GM 5 , Adv is left with only guessing the bit cn for winning the game after the Test(·) query. Then, we have,
From Eqs. (1) and (2), we have,
From Eqs. (7) and (8), we have,
According to the triangular inequality, we get the following:
Now from Eqs. (3), (4), (5) and (6), we get,
Thus, Eqs. (9) and (10) produce the following result:
Finally, after multiplying both sides of the above equation (Eq. 11) by a factor of 2, we get the required result as follows:
B. INFORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS
This section presents an informal security inspection of the proposed protocol (HEAP) and shows it is resilient against various other well-known attacks. This discussion are represented in the following propositions.
Proposition 1: HEAP is resilient against the privilegedinsider attacks.
Proof: According to the policy of the proposed protocol, during user enrollment task HCA j asks C i to give his or her user identity C ID and password PWD. After getting these parameters, HCA j transforms C i 's identity and password as
). HCA j encrypts both these transformed parameters and construct a message as msg C5 = {CMS ID , MT U, n 2 , E(K (NMS,C) : [PWD * , MT U, MBNO C ])}. HCA j then sends the message to the CMS.
Let a privileged-insider user of the CMS, being an adversary Adv, receives the message msg C5 and tries to extract the original identity of C i from MT U. Even if Adv is having the knowledge about R CMS C i and HCA ID , but it is still not sufficient for Adv to trace C i 's actual identity without having the value of r i . CMS can not decrypt the masked password
) because it does not have the key K NMS,C . Further, suppose a privileged-insider user of the NMS or ES, being an adversary Adv, gets the transformed identity and the password of C i and tries to extract the actual identity and password of C i . But, the adversary Adv can not disclose the original identity of C i due to the lack of knowledge about R CMS C i and r i . In the same way, Adv can not extract C i 's original password. Thus, the proposed protocol HEAP can protect the privileged-insider attacks.
Proposition 2: HEAP protects C i 's private information against workstation compromise attacks.
Proof: Let an adversary Adv controls C i 's workstation after successful accomplishment of C i 's t th session say S t . In such a provision, Adv captures MT U, C token ,
, V cc , P ns , V ns , Z 4 and TNS ID parameters from workstation credential cache. After gaining the knowledge about these parameters, Adv can not derive the future session key between C i and NS j say
||OTK new CMS,C ). Because, for the future session say S t+1 , C i chooses a fresh pseudo-random number say R new C = R C and NS j selects a fresh pseudo-random number say R new NS = R NS , and CMS chooses a fresh nonce say OTK new CMS,C = OTK old CMS,C to construct C new token = C old token . Since the adversary Adv does not have any knowledge about R new C , R new NS and OTK new CMS,C parameters for the session say S t+1 then it is hard to compute the future session key.
Additionally, some information related to C i namely EI, r i , K NMS,C and R CMS C i are stored into the workstation for verifying C i 's legitimacy at the time of user login and password change phase. This parameters are stored either in encrypted format or in a transformed manner using one way hash function. Therefore, without having the knowledge about the keys and breaking the hardness property of cryptographic one-way hash function, it is impossible to get the parameters. Thus, we can remark that the proposed protocol protects disclosure of C i 's confidential information through workstation compromise attacks. VOLUME 6, 2018 Proposition 3: HEAP is resilient against denial-of-service attacks.
Proof: In order to achieve user (or service provider) login, HEAP utilizes workstation-based authentication mechanism without involving the HEAP-KDC. In this connection, C i enters his identity (C ID ) and password (PWD) to HCA j . To verify the current user C i , HCA j computes EI = h(C ID || PWD) and check it with EI in its cookie. If both matches then HCA j load r
= USPW i . If it holds then HCA j accepts C i ; otherwise, HSA j treats C i as illegitimate user. As the first step verification has done only on the client-side and HEAP-KDC does not involve into this process then we say that HEAP can resists server-side denialof-service attacks.
Proposition 4: HEAP provides privacy preserving data integrity in Hadoop.
Proof: Form Proposition 8 and Assrt. 9, it is obvious that both C i and NS j (or JT j ) preserve their identities during session key establishment and Big Data service access task. Further, from Section V-D.9 and Section V-D.10, it could also be observe that HEAP stores (writes or appends) C i 's raw datablocks into several chunk servers (HDFS). During this process, HEAP computes a hashed MAC (HMAC) of each datablock and stores the HMAC along with the raw datablock into Datanode servers.
Suppose an adversary Adv or a malicious insiders change the content of the raw datablock. In such a provision, if C i processes his Big Data (basically the intercepted and modified data content) utilizing MapReduce framework then he will not get the desired result. To overcome this problem, in our proposed protocol, at the time of auditing or reading the datablock, C i would be able to check the integrity of each datablock utilizing his secret key (K NMS,C ) and HMAC. After checking the integrity of each datablocks, C i is permissible to process the Big Data utilizing JT j and it will lead C i to get the desired output.
Proposition 5: HEAP is resilient against known sessionspecific temporary information attacks.
Proof: During the session key establishment process between C i and NS j (or JT j ), suppose any one of the random nonce R C or R NS (or R JT ) is known to the adversary Adv. Therefore it is obvious that Adv can compute R C · P ns or R NS · ψ 1 C i , respectively. But, it is not sufficient for the adversary Adv to compute the session key
||OTK CMS,C ) without having the knowledge about OTK CMS,C . Further to compute OTK CMS,C = h(OTK CMS,NS || SID j NS ), the adversary Adv also requires the knowledge of SID j NS and OTK CMS,NS parameters. Moreover, Adv is unable to extract these parameters from OTK CMS,C due to the one-way property of cryptographic hash function and cryptographic hardness property associated with the stateless CBC mode of AES encryption/decryption policy. It is also observed from Remark 5 that the proposed protocol alleviate the known session-specific temporary information attacks.
Proposition 6: HEAP protects man-in-the-middle attacks. Proof: Suppose during session key establishment process, an adversary Adv tries to impersonate a legitimate client C i or service server NS j by eavesdropping the exchanged messages say MC 7 and MC 8 . However, in the proposed protocol, C i authenticates both CMS and NS j by verifying two conditions as (1) 
, respectively using NS token and message MC 7 . After validating the aforesaid conditions successfully, C i (or NS j ) establishes the session key SK C,NS between themselves, otherwise; terminate the process. Since, the adversary Adv does not have the knowledge about R C , R NS , OTK CMS,C , OTK CMS,NS , SID j NS and K CMS,NS so, it is impossible to impersonate either C i or NS j .
In addition to this, the simulation result of AVISPA based formal verification (see Section VII) is also substantiates that the other phases of the proposed protocol is robust against man-in-the-middle attacks. Thus, we remark that the proposed protocol is resilient against man-in-the-middle attacks.
Proposition 7: HEAP is resilient against identity compromise attacks.
Proof: In this attack, to protect both C i 's and NS j 's (or JT j ) original identities (C ID and TNS ID (or TJT ID )) from an adversary say Adv who controls either CMS or NMS or ES, in the proposed scheme, the identities are stored in a transformed manner into those servers. For example, C i 's original identity are stored as MT U = h(C ID Proof: During user and service server registration process both C i and NS j (or JT j ) are enroled themselves with HEAP-KDC utilizing their masked identities namely MT U and TNS ID (or TJT ID ). At the time of session key establishment task, C i computes its digital signature using C i 's masked identity (MT U) and an application generated pseudo random number (R C ). The same way, NS j (or JT j ) encapsulates TNS ID and R NS to construct its digital signature. Thereafter, the digital signature exchanges between C i and NS j (or JT j ) via a public channel lead to establish the session key between themselves. Due to the encapsulation of the pseudo random number, these digital signatures vis-a-vis the identities of both C i and NS j (or JT j ) are used to be dynamic and it will change in every sessions. Thus, the proposed scheme provides user and Big Data service server anonymity.
Proposition 9: HEAP assists untraceability of user and Big Data service servers.
Proof: Suppose an adversary Adv eavesdrops the message set {MC 7 , MC 8 } and tries to extract the original identities of C i and NS j (or JT j ). In this connection, Adv extracts
) (mod q) and V ns = R NS · H 2 (H 1 (TNS ID ||OTK CMS,C ))+ S NS · H 2 (P ns ) (mod q) parameters. Note here, these four parameters are implicitly derived from the original identity of either user C i or service server NS j (or JT j ), respectively. The adversary Adv can not trace the actual identities of C i and NS j (or JT j ) due to the adoption of collision-resistant cryptographic one way hash function towards the identity transformation. Thus, the proposed scheme satisfies the untraceability property.
Proposition 10: HEAP is resilient against offline dictionary attacks.
Proof: To make the proposed protocol resilient against offline dictionary attacks, C i transforms his actual password PWD using a system generated random secret r i , a server generated random nonce R CMS ), and later store this masked password (PWD * ) into NMS and ES servers.
Suppose a privileged insider acting as an adversary Adv compromises the dictionary of passwords from NMS (or ES) and tries to reveal the actual password of C i incorporating offline password guessing attacks. But, Adv can not extract C i 's actual password due to lack of knowledge about r i and R CMS C i parameters and usage of the collision-resistant cryptographic one way hash function towards password transformation. The same technique has been followed to protect BDSP's original password from the offline password guessing attacks.
Proposition 11: HEAP is robust against ciphertext-only attacks (COA) on C i 's or BDSP/BA's password.
Proof: Suppose during the single sign-on process, a passive adversary Adv listening the communication channel between C i and CMS for a particular session say S t , and eavesdrops the exchanged messages say MC 1 , MC 2 , MC 3 , MC 4 . Adv repeats this process for multiple sessions say S t , S (t+1) , S (t+2) , · · · , S (t+n) and collects a set of messages say and r i , so it is hard to guess the password from the ciphertexts set. In the similar way, HEAP is also robust against COA on BDSP/BA's password. Thus, completes the proof.
Proposition 12: HEAP is robust against stolen-verifier attacks.
Proof: Suppose a privileged insider acting as an adversary Adv steals C i 's masked identity and C i 's transformed password (i.e.,
) from NMS's (or ES's) database and tries to login into a workstation using HCA j . In this regard, HCA j computes EI = h(MT U|| PWD * ) and search the same into the workstation's cookies. Since, HCA j does not find such an entry into the cookies, it is obvious that HCA j rejects Adv's request. In order to satisfy the aforesaid search condition successfully, Adv needs the knowledge about the original user identity (C ID ) and password (PWD) of C i instead the masked identity and masked password of C i . In the same way, the proposed scheme does not allow an adversary Adv to login into the system by stealing BDSP/BA's credentials from the server (NMS or ES). Hence, we can conclude that, the proposed scheme protects stolen-verifier attacks.
Proposition 13: HEAP is resilient against impersonation attacks.
Proof: In order to access the Big Data storage and processing services from the remote service server (NS j or JT j ), an adversary Adv initially requires the actual identity and password of C i for sign in into the local workstation. In a similar way, to enrol the service servers of a Hadoop cluster, Adv needs the original identity and password of BDSP. Since, Adv does not have these parameters so it is computationally intractable to make a valid sign in request through HCA j or HSA k .
Further, during session key establishment, Adv does not have any means to steal the C i 's (or NS j 's) information to achieve mutual authentication in the presence of CMS. Because, retrieval of OTK CMS,C from C token is computationally hard. Moreover, during this mutual authentication task C i verifies both CMS and NS j whereas NS j checks the legitimacy of both CMS and C i seperately before establishment of the session key between themselves using the proposed digital signature based verification strategy. Since, the adversary Adv does not have OTK CMS,C , OTK CMS,NS , SID j NS , S C , S NS , R C and R NS parameters he would not be able to generate a valid digital signature. Thus, we remark that the proposed protocol has ability to protect user and service server impersonation attacks. in its system cache memory. Further, in order to VOLUME 6, 2018 protect the replay attacks during mutual authentication and cluster registration (service servers registration) phase, NMS can store λ 1
C i
and λ 2 C i into its cache memory temporarily. In a similar way, we can alleviate the replay attacks during session key formation task between C i and NS j (or JT j ) (also see Remark 3) and the other phases of the proposed protocol.
Proposition 15: HEAP is resilient against server spoofing attacks.
Proof: To impersonate both the server i.e., CMS and NMS to the end user C i , an adversary Adv needs to generate the valid V cnew = π 2 CMS + S NMS · H 2 (H 1 (K NMS,C )) (mod q) for the message MC 4 to satisfy the verification condition at user-side (C i ) as Proof: According to the proposed HEAP-KDC architecture, CMS interfaces with the clients whereas NMS interacts with the service providers and ES is reachable offline to both client and service provider at the time of principal registration process. Under the basic assumption of HEAP as discussed in Section V-C, the CMS server: which is the front server to the client (C i ): keeps the transformed identities (MT Us) of clients, the dictionary of R CMS C i , the secert credentials (SID j NS , SID j JT , K CMS,BDSP and BDSP * PWD ) of service providers (BDSPs) and service servers (NS j or JT j s), wherein the NMS server: which is the front-end server to the service providers (BDSPs): stores the client (C i ) secret credentials (PWD * s, K NMS,C ), the dictionary of R NMS BDSP and the transformed identities (MT U s) of service providers. In addition, ES keeps all the credentials of CMS and NMS servers in its custody for future use. In such a settings, two servers (CMS and NMS) are actively involved (two-server based handshaking) to achieve authentication of C i (or BDSP) at the time of single-sign on (or service server registration) process. Since, the secret credentials of C i (or BDSP) is distributed into two different servers, therefore it is resilient against SOV issue. Further, from Remark 4, we can observe that the proposed authentication framework resists SOF issue. Thus, completes the proof.
Proposition 17: HEAP provides both forward and backward secrecy.
Proof: To measure the forward and backward secrecy of the proposed protocol, we consider the simultaneous leakage of C i 's primary secret namely password PWD in the form of C token and its impact on the past and future session key security.
Suppose in a particular session, to establish a session key between C i and NS j (or JT j ), a pseudo random number say R C is chosen by C i whereas another pseudo random number say R NS (or R JT ) is selected by NS j . Although, both ψ 1
= R C · G and P ns = R NS · G are exchanged between C i and NS j via a public channel, it is computationally hard to reveal R C or R NS (or R JT ) from ψ 1
or P ns (or P jt ), respectively due to the intractability of ECDLP (see Section IV). Further, it is also impossible to compute R C ·R NS ·G or R NS ·R C ·G after getting P ns = R NS · G or ψ 1
= R C · G via a public channel due to the intractability of ECDDHP (refer Section IV). However, the session key
, P ns and OTK CMS,C parameters and C i 's password PWD has nothing to do with this computation. Thus, our proposed protocol achieves both forward and backward secrecy.
Proposition 18: HEAP provides mutual authentication.
Proof: During single sign-on process, C i checks the legitimacy of both CMS and NMS, and vice versa by verifying the following three conditions:
Step DKA6, Step DKA8 and Step DKA9, respectively (refer Section V-D.6). Further, at the time of session key establishment between C i and NS j , both of them verify their legitimacy along with CMS's legitimacy utilizing the following two conditions: (a)
as elaborated in
Step SKABSSA4 and Step SKAB-SSA7, respectively (see Section V-D.8. Thus, we can say that the proposed protocol achieves mutual authentication.
Proposition 19: HEAP provides dependable authentication services.
Proof: From Proposition 16, we can observe that the proposed authentication framework resolves the SOF and SOV issues of the key distribution center (HEAP-KDC). In such a setting, the failure or compromise of a server (CMS or NMS or ES) can not increase the downtime of the authentication system at mission critical situations.
According to the proposed authentication architecture, CMS has all the security credentials related to service providers, Hadoop cluster vis-a-vis service servers information and masked identities of users. NMS has all the security credentials related to C i , service providers masked identities and service servers masked identities. ES is having all the secret credentials of each principals which is the union of both CMS and NMS. Now, say for instance, if the active CMS suddenly fails and all its security credentials are lost due to some hardware related issues then a stand-by CMS will be restored the whole system by configuring it from the back-up server say ES via a secure channel. In a similar way, the failure of an active NMS can be restored by a stand-by NMS. Further, if the trusted server say ES fails then the maintenance engineer and system administrator easily rebuild it from both active CMS and active NMS servers. Note here, a trusted server ES (operates in an offline mode) is currently having all the secret credentials related to each principal of the system including the master CMS and NMS. It may also be noted that, we consider here only one server (CMS or NMS or ES) can fail at a particular point of time. Therefore, from the above discussion, we can remark that both maintenance engineer and system administrator operates under HEAP-KDC would be able to restore the whole KDC in no time. Thus, the proposed protocol provides dependable authentication services.
Proposition 20: HEAP provides single sign-on facility.
Proof: According to the proposed protocol policy, C i can access any service servers (that belongs to a particular Hadoop cluster) after authenticating himself utilizing both CMS and NMS servers (two-server based authentication). This authentication process is a one time task. After that, C i can make any numbers of service server request from CMS throughout the session.
VII. FORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS USING AVISPA
In HEAP, we have two mutual authentication and session key agreement tasks: 1) to register the service servers visa-vis the Hadoop cluster with HEAP-KDC online, service provider's administrator (BA) needs to authenticate himself to HEAP-KDC (utilizing both NMS and CMS servers) and vice versa, and 2) to access the service server NS j or JT j from a distinct cluster, the end user C i needs to authenticate himself utilizing both CMS and NMS servers and vice versa. To achieve this two cases, we proposed two different authentication strategies as discussed above. In order to validate these two proposed authentication protocols, we utilize a well-known and widely used Internet security protocol verification tool, called AVISPA (Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications) [79] - [81] . This tool is used to test whether a security protocol is safe against an active or passive adversary, such as man-in-the-middle and replay attacks.
Currently, AVISPA tool version 1.1 12 is equipped with four implicit back-end model checkers, namely i) On-thefly Model-Checker (OFMC), ii) Constraint Logic based Attack Searcher (CL-AtSe), iii) SAT-based Model-Checker (SATMC) and iv) Tree Automata based on Automatic Approximations for the Analysis of Security Protocols (TA4SP). Further, each model checker is also equipped with different state-of-the-art automatic analysis algorithms. The internal hierarchy of AVISPA tool and its modules are shown in Figure 25 . The following steps are needed to simulate a security protocol in this tool:
Step 1: The proposed protocol needs to be codified into HLPSL (High Level Protocols Specification Language) [81] , where HLPSL is the de facto language according to the specification of AVISPA.
Step 2: Save the designed code into a file with hlpsl extension. For example, we save two of our proposed codes 12 Figure 25 ).
Step 5: Eventually, the IF file is given to each model checker and the model checker test the proposed protocol is safe or unsafe or inconclusive. The IF file is the required input file format of each aforementioned model checker to test the designed protocol. We have implemented the codes for two proposed protocols in HLPSL and save them into two different files namely Heap_BNMSfinal.hlpsl and SK_CNS.hlpsl. The detailed description on HLPSL and various protocols implementations in AVISPA are available in [80] and [81] . Under Heap_BNMSfinal.hlpsl file, initially we specify basic roles of all the participants (BDSP, NMS and CMS) and then make composite role for representing different cases or scenarios derived from the basic roles. Similarly, under SK_CNS.hlpsl, we present the basic roles for C i , CMS, NMS and NS j and construct the composite role (or session) involving all the participants.
We simulate both the files using AVISPA under the widely-used OFMC and SATMC back-ends and summarized the simulation results in Figure 26 and 27. The simulation results show that the proposed two protocols in HEAP are safe from man-in-the-middle and replay attacks.
VIII. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
This section analyzes the performance of HEAP. Currently, HEAP protocol consists of two modules: (1) Big Data service provider module and (2) client module. We evaluate the performance of HEAP based on these module and present them in Table 4 and Table 5 aforesaid operations are taken form [63] and it is summarized in Table 3 . In the proposed protocol phases, we use logical XOR operation but it is not depicted in Table 3 . Because, this operation takes a negligible amount of time say, T xor = 10 −9 seconds as compare to the other as mentioned in Table 3 . Therefore, we do not consider T xor for CT computation for both service provider and client modules (refer Table 4 and Table 5 ). Table 4 and Table 5 . Note here, for ease of CO calculation, we assume here: (i) the bit length of each certificate is equal to the bit length of the public-key (i.e., 160 bits ECC key), (ii) the bit length of the masked identity is 160 bits, (iii) |nonce| = 32 bits, (iv) the bit length of the server's original identity is 32 bits and (v) the bit length of cipher-text or plain-text block is 128 bits (using AES-128 bit encryption/decryption policy). 3) Storage Cost (SC) in terms of bits -To achieve a particular task (namely user registration, user login, etc.) in the proposed protocol, few security credentials are need to be stored previously either in client-side or server-side or both. The storage cost tells about this pre-loaded credentials in terms of bits. For example, to achieve user login, HCA i needs to load r * i and USPW i (total |r * i | + |USPW | = 320 bits) credentials into C i 's workstation. Similarly, to accomplish the service provider login, HSA j needs to load d * and BDPW (total |d * | + |BDPW | = 320 bits) into BDSP's workstation. We highlights the SC for each phase of the proposed protocol in Table 4 and  Table 5 . Note here, to achieve a successful user registration and single sign-on task, NMS needs to keep (|K NMS,C |+ |D C ID |+ |D PWD |), a total of (64 + 64 + 64) bits = 192 bits, and both NMS and CMS need to store (|MT U|+ |PWD * |+ |R CMS C i |+ |K NMS,C |), a total of (160+160+32+64) bits = 416 bits, respectively. Further, to make a Big Data storage or processing service server ticket request, the proposed protocol needs to store the masked identity of either NS j or JT j (160 bits) into HCA i . 4) Communication Rounds (CR) -A single communication round represents a one-way message transmission. In this regards, we compute CR for each phases of the proposed protocol and it is shown in Table 4 and  Table 5 . Tables 4 and 5 show that the proposed protocol is quite efficient in terms of communication, storage and computation cost considering all the participants. Consider C i with HCA i , for instance; it needs 0.00128 seconds and 0.17588 seconds, a total of 0.17716 seconds ≈ 177 milliseconds (ms) (refer Scenario 2 from Table 5 ) to login into the system and validate the legitimacy of HEAP-KDC, respectively. After C i 's single sign-on (or establishment of the session key with CMS), the C i needs approximately 0.10072 seconds (1T E + 1T D + 4T ecsm + 1T mod + 6T hash ) ≈ 101 ms to access a particular service server (i.e., either NS j or JT j ) from any Hadoop cluster (which is registered with the HEAP-KDC) followed by a mutual authentication and session key agreement phase. According to the computational cost analysis of the proposed protocol, service provider enrollment and password updation tasks will take ≈ 188 ms and ≈ 18.08 ms and with the same cost, user achieves his registration and password change phases. In addition to this, a service provider can seamlessly enroll his own Hadoop cluster with the HEAP-KDC by compromising only 33.6 ms (here, we assume that the Hadoop cluster consists of a single storage service server and a single processing server). In spite of this, we compare our scheme with the existing state of the art authentication protocols as follows. 
A. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
This section compares the proposed protocol HEAP with other state of the art authentication strategies. For comparison, we consider only login and authentication phases of the proposed protocol. Further, we consider three crucial performance metrics namely communication overhead, CPU usage (or computation time) and storage cost as compared with other schemes. The detail comparative analysis is discussed as follows:
1) COMPARISON OF COMPUTATION COSTS
In order to perform the computational cost analysis, we consider various schemes related to Big Data, Cloud and Internet of Thing (IoT) platforms, and are available in recent literature [17] , [46] , [47] , [55] - [63] . Further, we consider various two-server based PAKE protocols [64] - [68] for the analysis. Since its inception, the schemes [17] , [46] , [47] , [55] - [63] follow single server based authentication strategy whereas others [64] - [68] follow two-server based analogy. From Table 6 , we can observe that our proposed scheme is better than that of existing two-server based approaches [64] - [68] . Mean while, the proposed scheme is also quite comparable with the traditional single server based authentication approaches.
2) COMPARISON OF COMMUNICATION OVERHEADS
In communication overhead analysis, we compare the proposed protocol with the aforesaid schemes and summarize it in Table 7 . It is easy to say that our scheme is efficient (only 3520 bits need to be transferred between C i and HEAP-KDC for first time authentication or single-sign on and for future single-sign on only 2880 bits are required) as compare to the two-server based authentication schemes [65] - [68] (needs 4480, 3840, 4480 and 4000 bits). Further, we can observe that our scheme has the same CO compared with Kumari et al. [62] . In fact, our scheme is quite admirable in terms of the CO as compare with the single server based strategy. The proposed scheme's communication overhead is equal to the CO of He and Wang's scheme [59] .
3) COMPARISON OF STORAGE COSTS
The memory usage (or pre-deployed secrets storage cost) is involved to smooth execution of the proposed scheme as compare to the aforementioned schemes are shown in Table 8 . We can see that, our scheme is efficient in terms of memory usage (client's workstation as well as server-side) than both Karla and Sood and Kumari et al. schemes. Although, our scheme is lagging in terms of storage overhead as compare with the existing state of the art two-server based authentication strategies. The remaining schemes (shown in Table 8 ) are not explicitly analyzed the storage overhead in their works. So, we represent it as N/A in Table 8 .
Besides all the above cost factors, the proposed scheme supports several security and functional features (SFFs) as compare to the other schemes. This SFFs are discussed as follows.
4) COMPARISON OF SECURITY AND FUNCTIONAL FEATURES
In this section, we discuss several Security and Functional Features (SFFS) of the proposed protocol and compare it with other existing state of the art schemes. We summarize this discussion in Table 9 . Form Table 9 , it has been observed that the proposed scheme HEAP fulfills various security and functional features as compare with different state of the art schemes.
IX. DISCUSSIONS
This section summarizes the major potentials of the proposed scheme. In this regard, various appealing features of the proposed user identity and password-assisted two-server authentication and key exchange framework are highlighted as follows: 1) With the proposed enrolment strategy, a Big Data service provider's administrator can securely deploy his cluster vis-a-vis service servers online with authentication service provider (HEAP-KDC). In order to achieve this, the administrator needs to login into the system using his identity and password only. Thus, the cluster enrollment policy is scalable and user friendly in nature.
2) The proposed HEAP-KDC is robust against single point of failure and single point of vulnerability. Further, it could tolerate various well-known attacks. Hence, HEAP can able to provide dependable and secure authentication service 24×7 to the customers. 3) With the proposed two-server based single sign-on scheme, the client can access any number of Namenode servers (NS j s) or JobTrackers (JT j s) from a Hadoop cluster by logging in into the system only once. During single sign-on process, a secure mutual authentication process takes place which ensures the legitimacy of both C i and the dual-server (CMS and NMS). 4) The adoptation of two-factor authentication (password and delegated token) and dual-server based session key establishment strategy makes the proposed authentication system more robust, cost effective and user friendly. 5) The key rollover problem is a crucial issue for traditional user registration policy, where during session key establishment, a long-term secret key password) is used to build a secret channel between user and Registration Authority (RA). With this settings, it is very difficult for a user to change or update his long-term credential i.e., password into RA (a centralized server) for security reasons. Since, the proposed protocol has a provision to update user's password online and has an ability to recover the password utilizing a out-of-band channel (i.e., postal network) or a valid email id (or registered mobile number), it is obvious that the current settings of the proposed approach mitigates the key rollover problem. 6) The utilization of 160 bits public/private key (ECC) and 128 bits symmetric key (AES) as compared to 4096 bits key-size reported in [64] - [68] needs lesser memory space (storage in terms of bits) and reduce communication overheads. 7) The proposed two-server based authentication and key exchange protocol does not have any compatibility hurdle with the traditional single-server based approaches [17] , [46] , [47] , [62] , but yields better dependability (fault-tolerant in terms of secret credentials distribution and replication) and security (resists more well-known attacks). The utilization of two separate application instances say HCA and HSA divide the users domain into two distinct categories, hence maintenance of both client and service provider is easy. Further, HEAP-KDC encloses a less number of verification parameters (i.e., masked identity, pass-phrase and digital signature) inside CT and NST , that decreases the verification cost for C i and NS j (or JT j ), respectively 8) The proposed protocol preserves both user and service server (NS or JT ) identities from external as well as internal adversaries (malicious insider control HEAP-KDC's server). In such a provision, it is very difficult to trace the on-going activities among end users', HEAP-KDC's servers and service servers'.
X. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a new fault tolerant two-server authentication and key agreement protocol (HEAP) for Hadoop framework to access secure and privacy preserved Big Data storage and processing services. To achieve this objective, initially, C i needs to login into its workstation using his identity and password. Then, the single sign-on mechanism vis-a-vis the session key formation task has been carried out in which an end user C i and CMS server establish a session secret key SK C,CMS between themselves with the help of NMS server, followed by a mutual authentication process. With this session secret key SK C,CMS , C i can make a service server (Big Data storage or Big Data processing service server) requests to CMS server through a secure channel.
In the next-level, CMS responses C i with two tokens (C token and NS token or JT token ). Utilizing these two tokens, both C i and NS j (or JT j ) are mutually authenticate themselves and establish the session key for secure future communication.
In this work, we proposed a new key distribution center (HEAP-KDC), where we can distribute and replicate the security credentials of each principal in such a way that it makes the overall authentication system more dependable and fault-tolerant.
The rigorous security analysis of HEAP under de facto ROR simulation (formal analysis) and informal inspection shows that the proposed scheme is provably secure. Moreover, the security of the proposed protocol (HEAP) is also verified utilizing the widely-used AVISPA protocol simulator tool. All these security analysis outputs shows that HEAP is robust against active and passive adversary. In addition, the performance analysis evident that the proposed protocol (HEAP) is effective in terms of computation, communication and storage costs, and comparable with the existing state-of-art schemes.
In the future, we plan to integrate HEAP with a real-world large scale cluster setting (or real-time Hadoop cluster) and try to re-calibrate it further to enhance the security and performance with the real-world deployment. 
